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Travis J. Cook

Engineering Modernity: The Aswan Low Dam and Modernizing the Nile
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The completion of the Aswan Low Dam in 1902 was trumpeted by British
policymakers and engineers as a great engineering feat and triumph over the forces
of the Nile River. The Dam symbolized a break from traditional irrigation methods
that had sustained people in the Nile River Valley for millennia and symbolized a
new era of international relations for Egypt. Successors of the Aswan Low Dam have
included a number of alterations to the original and the construction of the Aswan
High Dam seven km upriver in the 1960s. The Aswan High Dam has garnered much
attention from critics of modernization theory, environmentalists and proponents of
the Dam alike. However, much of the social and environmental issues that are
debated in the historical discourse surrounding the Aswan High Dam were present
throughout the history of its antecedent. Understanding the social and
environmental issues involved with the construction of the first Aswan Dam
provides an example of the potential impacts of large-scale environmental programs
on the people who inhabit the areas where they are pursued. Ultimately, the
construction of the Aswan Low Dam was the product of British colonial
administrators, informed by Orientalist and modernist biases, whose predilections
of the value of damming the Nile left them overlooking the social and environmental
impacts of this engineering project, which would be repeated sixty years later and
continue to have implications for the people who inhabit the Nile River Valley and
surrounding bioregion.
The construction of the Aswan Low Dam spanned a four-year period from
1898 to 1902. Structurally, it was a large buttress dam that crossed the Nile at
Aswan, forever altering the ecosystem of the Nile and its watersheds. The main
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purpose of the Aswan Low Dam was to provide water for perennial irrigation and
flood control, both of which would radically transform the seasonal patterns of the
Nile and the traditional subsistence strategies for those who relied on the water and
surrounding land of the Nile River Valley for subsistence. By the 1960s the Aswan
High Dam thwarted its predecessor in size and would take center stage in the
historiography on environmental technology on the Nile.
Although the Aswan High Dam has garnered much attention from scholars in
multiple disciplines throughout the world, the history of the Aswan Low Dam can be
divided into two separate historiographical camps. The first looks at the economic,
social and political transformations brought to Egypt by the Dam through a lens of
modernization and development. In the colonial context, the development model
was underpinned by a series of Western European prejudices that left policy makers
viewing the people of the Middle East and North Africa as less civilized and capable
than their Western counterparts. Edward Said describes these sets of assumptions
within the concept of Orientalism. Said argues that, “Orientalism is a style of thought
based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the
Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident.’”1 With the creation of these ethnic and
racial binaries coupled with the ‘modernizing’ worldview contained in the British
vision of progress colonial officials were able to justify projects like the Aswan Low
Dam as bringing progress, through engineering, to a people who heretofore were
incapable of properly utilizing the environment themselves.
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Modernization or development theorists have a history of validating western
international development projects and include scholars from Talcott Parsons to
Walt Rostow.2 An underpinning of modernist thought is that, “social, economic and
political changes were fundamentally integrated, such that fundamental
transformations in one aspect of society would necessarily trigger others.”3 Michael
Latham discusses the origins of modernization theory by exploring Parson’s ideas of
the difference between the “‘traditional’ and ‘rational’ (or ‘modern’) as historical
conditions, and that ‘development’ involved the successful transition from the
former to the latter.”4 The basic ideology that interlocking institutions, if positioned
correctly, would lead to a Western type of modernization often involved
environmental projects that oriented the economies of developing countries within
the export based models of the West. Modernization theorists in the latter half of the
twentieth century sought to distance themselves from colonial economic models,
but, as will be shown below, the linear conception of development and undervaluing
of traditional agricultural methods that justified the Aswan High Dam, among other
transformative post-colonial programs, were very similar to the colonial concepts of
development.
Many of the British colonial officials that were involved with the Aswan Low
Dam were informed by a nearly identical development ideology, which also directed
the work of historians that include Bent Hansen, Karim Nashashibi and Robert
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Tignor. These scholars belong to a historiographical camp that describes the
creation of the Aswan Low Dam in glowing terms. Tignor writes that, “[t]he dam
immediately proved its value to Egypt. The flood of 1905 was extremely low, and it
was feared that the summer supply would prove insufficient. The dam was put into
use and the irrigation waters were distributed throughout Egypt without
difficulty.”5 Furthermore, Hansen and Nashashibi recognize the Dam as useful to
Egypt for regulating the cotton export economy by arguing that “[d]uring close to a
century of free trade the cotton economy was developed to a high level of
perfection.”6 There are a number of modernist assumptions that can be observed
through the work of these scholars. These historians almost always describe the
efforts of the British engineering projects as benefiting the Egyptians themselves.
Furthermore, the transition away from traditional irrigation methods is always
framed as following a linear path that is seen as progress. These assumptions and
representations have informed much of the scholarship, or lack thereof on the first
Aswan Dam.
There are many implications of this scholarship for the people who inhabit the
Nile River Valley. Perhaps most damaging is that irrigation methods developed by
the people in these regions over thousands of years is nearly unanimously
overlooked. One example of this is the lack of the discussion of Ibn Al-Haythem in
the dominant historiography of irrigation on the Nile. Under the Fatimids in the
early 11 century Al-Haythem, a philosopher and mathematician, was moved from
5
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Iraq to Egypt to build an engineering work that would “regulate the flow of the
Nile.”7 Upon arriving in Egypt, Al-Haythem had realized the implausibility of these
plans and faked madness to extricate himself from the project. Al-Haythem’s case
highlights the expertise of the people who sought to manage the waters of the Nile
prior to British intervention. It also reveals the technological sophistication of basin
irrigation, which allowed the Nile floods to replenish the soil of the river valley
annually and depended on a series of canals to irrigate crops. In a region of North
Africa that received very little rain this irrigation method provided sustenance for
the peoples of the Nile River Valley for thousands of years and, as recognized by AlHaythem, would be drastically altered by engineering works that sought to regulate
it.
In an attempt to re-conceptualize the impact of the Aswan Low Dam and other
interventions by Western developers in North Africa a second historiographical
school has emerged in the post-colonial era. This post-colonial scholarship includes
historians Timothy Mitchell, Daniel Headrick and Diana K. Davis among others.
Headrick identifies technical and engineering projects as essential for colonial
ambitions. He writes that, “the appearance of a new technology can trigger or
reinforce a motive by making the desired end possible or acceptably inexpensive.”8
Headrick’s juxtaposition of technology at the center of colonial studies provides an
overview of the way that colonial officials provided the means for their desired ends
through technology. In the case of Egypt, projects like the Aswan Low Dam, which
7
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were framed in modernization discourse reoriented Egyptian social, political and
economic institutions to fit the prevailing Euro-centric international economic
model that promoted perennial production of export mono-crops.
These scholars also re-examined the utility of the Aswan Low Dam by extricating
the project from Orientalist or modernizing biases. Once this becomes the aim of
historians the significance of the Aswan Low Dam appears very different. For
example, instead of seeing the Dam as being valuable for the Egyptian people by
bringing prosperity to the region, Mitchell notes that by 1933 due to the Aswan Low
Dam project only, “one-fifth of the Nile valley was now irrigated by the river’s
annual flood, which in the past had fertilized the soil by depositing a layer of silt and
nutrients…By the end of the 1930s Egyptian farmers were using 600,000 tons of
fertilizer a year.”9 Mitchell’s description of the dam varies greatly from development
minded scholars because of his ability to separate himself from that theoretical
framework. His work stresses the difference in irrigation and fertilization practices,
but questions the beneficence of these invasive reorientations of Egyptian
agriculture.
Building on the work of Headrick and Mitchell scholars who include Jennifer
Derr, Jennie Sowers and Alan Mikhail have contributed greatly to the study of Egypt
in the colonial period. These scholars take an environmental history approach that
explores the impact that environmental policies have had on the inhabitants of
colonized regions. Perhaps not surprisingly, all of these scholars focus heavily on the
Nile and colonial irrigation policies. Derr notes that “[a]s infrastructure modified the
9
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river and its interactions with the lands and communities along its banks, the
experience of colonial authority interfaced with larger environmental and
agricultural trends.”10 By promoting a specific type of development based on export
agriculture the British gained the ability to control the practices of agriculturalists
and reinvent the mode of subsistence for many Egyptians.
As the post-colonial scholarship discussed above highlights, the creation of
projects like the Aswan Low Dam are dependent not only on the environment, but
the cultural forces at play during the time of the Dam’s construction. The focus of the
British on creating the Aswan Low Dam had its roots in nineteenth century British
conceptions of Egypt. The British notions of Egyptian history resemble those of the
French in Algeria as discussed by Diana K. Davis. Davis argues that in French Algeria
“there emerged a colonial environmental narrative that blamed the indigenous
peoples, especially herders, for deforesting and degrading what was once the
apparently highly fertile ‘granary of Rome’ in North Africa.”11 The Egyptian context
differed slightly from Algeria because the demonized Arab inhabitants of Egypt
were sedentary, but they were nevertheless blamed for the underutilization of the
Nile’s resources. The imposition of a declensionist narrative brought on by the
inhabitants of colonized people on Egyptian history has and continues to give a
sense of legitimacy to those who pursue grand environmental engineering projects
in the name of progress.
10
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The legitimacy of the Aswan Low Dam in particular was rooted in Western
conceptions of the Nile as being underutilized by the denizens of the Nile River
Valley. Orientalist assumptions about the people and landscape of the region had its
roots in the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Napoleon compiled a number of artistic renderings of the ancient ruins along the
Nile in the Description de l’Egypt. Joan Schwartz and James Ryan argue that these
images allowed “only the savants [to] ‘organize the view’, only they were equipped
to bring a sense of perspective and composition to the labyrinth of ruins that were
thereby marked as a dispersed originary of a definitively European history.”12
Within this framework the ancient ruins of Egypt began to be seen by Western
Europeans as their own cultural heritage, left to deteriorate from the misuse by the
Egyptian inhabitants.
Schwartz and Ryan go on to point out that “[i]n the course of the following
decades the photography of Egypt’s monumental landscapes was professionalized
and commercialized.”13 These photos of the monuments often excluded the
inhabitants of the region in a way that cleared the way for Western European
onlookers to place the history of Egypt and the Nile within a Western-centric
historical narrative. This became a process that reinforced Orientalist conceptions
of the peoples of the Nile River Valley and the Western interest in correcting that
perceived decline.

12

Joan M. Schwartz and James R. Ryan, Picturing Place: Photography and the
Geographical Imagination (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 198.
13 Schwartz and Ryan, 207.

Cook, 10
A tradition that ran parallel to the photographic one included popular travel
guides that discussed the people and landscapes of Egypt in the nineteenth century.
These guides fit within the artistic and photographic depictions of Egypt already
available to would-be Western European tourists heading to Egypt. A recurring
theme in these guidebooks involved the devaluing of the land and peoples of the
Nile River Valley. One travel book from 1885 reveals the way that the othering of the
landscapes related to the Orientalist view of the people. It argued that “the valley of
the Nile, [was Egypt’s] only productive part, inhabited by a tax-paying population.”14
The same book goes on to describe the origins of the people of Egypt as being
related directly to the Nile. The book’s author noted that “[f]or thousands of years
the banks of the Nile have been occupied by the Egyptians…and still exhibiting many
of their ancient personal characteristics unaltered…the character of its inhabitants
been apparently molded by the influences of that river.”15 By devaluing the rest of
the landscape outside of the Nile River Valley these imperial narratives promoted a
specific type of social organization that excluded nomadic peoples. Furthermore, the
people of the Nile River Valley were described as inferior and somehow beholden to
the Nile itself in a way that devalued their own ingenuity and understanding of the
river.
These depictions of a simple people tied to the river by their inferiority to
enlightened Western populates were also prevalent through artwork in the late
nineteenth century. Frederick Goodall’s painting, The Rising of the Nile (1865, Figure
1), depicted a group of distressed villagers fleeing the Nile floodwaters that were
14
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inundating their village.16 In the distance one can see the pyramids and the biblical
feel of the painting, due to its depiction of ancient peoples and ancient architecture,
embodies the view of many Western Europeans regarding the primitive
backwardness of the inhabitants of the Nile River Valley. The people are depicted as
beholden to the forces of the river as they are forced out of their town. They also are
positioned as primitive agriculturalists that engage in ancient pastoral practices.
Finally, the biblical themes and ancient ruins depict the people of Egypt as
historically static and hence similar to the primitive ancestors of Western
Europeans. Once the people of the Nile River Valley were depicted as victims of the
annual rhythms of the Nile, the stage was set to depict flood control of the Nile as
beneficial to the inhabitants of the Nile River Valley.
These depictions of the Egyptian people ran parallel to a series of political
developments that gave the British wide-ranging political power in Egypt. After the
French departure from Egypt in 1801 a Turco-Albanian military official named
Muhammad Ali consolidated control and implemented a series of reforms that
greatly reorganized Egypt into a nation-state.17 The Ali Dynasty would persist
through most of the nineteenth century and drastically reform agricultural practices
as well.
The main shift in agriculture was away from subsistence crops that were
seasonal and depended largely on the annual rhythms of the river to a system that
promoted export crops. Al-Sayyid notes that this process was accomplished by
16

MaryAnne Stevens, The Orientalists: Delacroix to Matisse: European Painters in
North Africa and the Near East (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 1984), 180.
17 Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 37.

Cook, 12
selling off lands that had been appropriated from small farmers by the French and
redistributed to the new Egyptian elite. Disposition and conscription through a
system of forced labor known as corvee also altered the life of Egyptian
agriculturalists by increasing the days these laborers would work annually from
roughly 150 to 250 days per year.18 This development of an Egyptian nation-state
and reorientation of labor and agriculture created a system that was appealing to
foreign interests.
Foreign attention in the agricultural exports of Egypt began very early on and
left the French and British absorbed in the political and economic affairs of this
emerging nation state. Most notably the British sought to ensure an economic
advantage in trade within the Ottoman Empire in the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limon.
This treaty was drafted and signed in order to confront the growing power of
Muhammad Ali who at this time had expanded beyond his Egyptian governorship to
threaten other Ottoman holdings. In return for military support to kick Ali’s forces
out of Syria the Ottoman Empire ratified the treaty with Great Britain. Among other
things, the treaty ensured that “[t]he subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, or their
agents, shall be permitted to purchase at all places in the Ottoman Dominions
(whether for the purposes of international trade or exportation) all articles, without
any exception whatsoever.”19 These measures were framed as mutually beneficial
for the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain under the liberal free trade ideologies

18
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articulated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. In reality these measures were
intended to prevent the protectionism sought by Ali and other Ottoman governors,
which would have promoted a non euro-centric industrialization. The treaty also
gave British manufacturers unrestricted access to the cotton grown in Egypt.
The Treaty of Balta Limon was by no means the only way that European
powers sought to gain from involvement in Egyptian affairs. One of the largest
environmental projects to be pursued in the nineteenth century was the
construction of the Suez Canal, which was completed in 1869. This project, coupled
with shifts in the international cotton market, left the Egyptian government
indebted to many European powers. The French had mainly participated in the
practices of loaning money and buying shares in the Suez Canal project.20 However,
by 1876 the complications with this project and other international debt would set
in motion a process that legitimized the British occupation of Egypt six years later.
An 1876 decree from the Egyptian Khedivel establishing a European controlled
public debt administration reveals these problems over debt and the way the British
saw their role in the affairs of Egypt because of it. The decree was officially created
to settle ballooning debt, but it officially allowed a centralized agency under English
control to “receive the funds for the yearly payment due to the English Government,
and representing the interest of the Suez Canal shares.”21 This growing influence of
British policymakers in Egyptian affairs would culminate in the 1882 British
occupation of Egypt.
20
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The colonial official put in charge of Egyptian affairs immediately looked to
putting a dam on the Nile to bring economic prosperity to Egypt. Evelyn Baring
(Lord Cromer) was made British Council-General of Egypt in 1883. Perhaps not
surprisingly, in the climate of the Egyptian Government’s financial woes, Cromer’s
mandate was to help pay off the Egyptian government’s loans and to ‘modernize’ the
country.22 Building the Aswan Low Dam became a focus of Cromer for a number of
reasons. Not only would it provide for a Western model of development, but in
Cromer’s view “if any civilized power holds the waters of the Upper Nile, it may in
the end be in a position to exercise a predominating influence on the future of
Egypt.”23 Cromer’s conception of the value of the Dam would be that it gave the
British hegemonic power over the peoples of Egypt by harnessing their most vital
resource. Furthermore, he assumed that no civilized people other than the ancient
Egyptians had harnessed the waters of the Nile properly.
This fit within the tendency of British colonial officials to try and distance
themselves from the Ottomans by emphasizing European technological expertise.
These efforts were based in a devaluation of the irrigation systems already in place
along the Nile. However, developing irrigation infrastructure to harness the
resources of the Nile had been occurring in the Nile River Valley for thousands of
years. Since at least the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in the
affairs of the people of the Nile River Valley included the intensive promotion of
canal development, which allowed them to collect taxes off of crops that followed

22
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the flood and drought cycles of the Nile.24 Furthermore, as discussed above, when
Muhammad Ali gained control in Egypt he instructed much of the corvee labor force
to develop canals and irrigation systems and promoted a centralized system of
growing cash-crops.25 It was only in the minds of British colonial officials that no
civilized people had utilized the river properly through development projects. The
Aswan Low Dam would serve as the tool to achieve the desired colonial aim of
separating Egyptian irrigation from a perceived uncivilized and primitive past.
Cromer had also brought with him all the Orientalist prejudices that
underpinned much of the colonial thought discussed above. When describing the
people of the Nile River Valley he urges his readers to:
“[c]ontrast again the talkative European, bursting with superfluous energy, active in
mind, inquisitive about everything he sees and hears, chafing under delay, and impatient
of suffering, with the grave and silent Eastern, devoid of energy and initiative, stagnant
in mind, wanting in curiosity about matters which are new to him, careless of waste of
time and patient under suffering.”26

He continued his critique of the people to the political realm by discussing the
failures of the Egyptian military to retain order within their ranks in the early 1880s
by stating that the army should have better-known the “naturally suspicious
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character of the Orientals.”27 These assumptions left Cromer in a position that
devalued traditional forms of irrigation and subsistence as mere misunderstandings
of simple-minded Easterners and framed his role in the government to control these
‘naturally suspicious’ peoples.
These Orientalist prejudices held by Cromer legitimized his role in promoting
the socially and ecologically transformative Aswan Low Dam project. In his
reflection on the transitions of Egyptian irrigation he asks “[h]ow did man utilize his
advantages? In the early days of Egyptian civilization, he made great and creditable
efforts to turn them to account…[t]he Turks, who ultimately succeeded them, hid
theirs in a napkin.”28 By placing the irrigation systems of the ‘Turks’ within a
declensionist framework and devaluing local knowledge Cromer had created a
vision of his role in the Aswan Low Dam project as benign for the peoples of Egypt.
Once he decided on this project of almost divine intervention in the affairs of
Egyptian agriculturalists he promoted the Dam project as “a grand opportunity for
the English man.”29 In order to create the Dam he would have to rely on British
engineers who were equally as fascinated with ancient and biblical narratives and
just as steeped in Orientalist prejudice.
Within the colonial Egyptian narrative it was up to the engineers to return
the Nile River Valley to its former glory. The British engineers were active
throughout the nineteenth century in depicting the Nile through photographs and
27
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visual representations. An Egyptian civil engineer named Felix Teynard began
photographing the ruins along the Nile in the 1850s in order to create “a
photographic atlas’ that would, so he hoped, ‘complement’ the Description de lEgypte.”30 This was an early example that placed the Egyptian ruins within the
broader context of Western engineering. As this narrative developed, British civil
engineers began to place themselves alongside the great ancient engineers of the
ruins.
Throughout the nineteenth century British engineers also photographed
biblical ruins in the Middle East. Schwartz explores engineering expeditions that
included biblical scholars which caused problems for the engineers as, “[t]he
intellectual inquiry was to be informed by two potentially divergent mental habits:
an absolute faith in the literal truth of scripture on the one hand, and the demands of
scientific accuracy on the other.”31 Through the dual endeavors of representing
biblical and Egyptian ruins as the forbearers of British engineering these
technocrats had reinforced their own role in rescuing Egypt from decline and reified
their Orientalist assumptions.
There were a number of prolific British engineers who worked on the Aswan
Low Dam that included Benjamin Baker and John Aird.32 William Willcocks stands
out among these engineers due to his central role in planning the Aswan Low Dam
and his prolific writings on Nile irrigation. For Willcocks, like the travel guide

30
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discussed above, Egypt’s value lay primarily in the Nile River Valley.33 This led him
to actively promote the Aswan Low Dam project to Cromer and other British
officials. In 1933 his obituary in the Royal Geographical Journal bemoaned the loss of
a man who “spent most of his professional career, in which he distinguished himself
as the greatest irrigation engineer of his time…in the service of the Egyptian
Government.”34 As his obituary read, his efforts were also framed in developmental
discourse as benefiting the Egyptians over any other interested parties.
However, the British engineers were often trained through working in India
for the East India Company, which influenced their Orientalist worldviews.35 This
would be coupled with the hubris of Willcocks who saw himself as continuing a
tradition that began among the ancients and was maintained through Western
European engineering expertise. Willcocks also consulted sources that included
Herodotus and the Bible, which gave him faith in the Egyptian declensionist
narrative. In 1904 Willcocks wrote that, “Egypt, in Roman times, supported a
population twice as dense as that of to-day.”36 Willcocks clearly saw his role in
building the Aswan Low Dam as returning Egyptian agricultural productivity to a
perceived ancient abundance.
Willcocks’ efforts on the Dam were also underpinned by his own conception
of the god-like abilities of engineers to create long lasting structures that could cure
human suffering. Both his obituary and the preface to one of his books refer to him
33
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as Joseph from the Old Testament.37 The biblical story of Joseph involved Joseph
foretelling of seven years of famine to an Egyptian Pharaoh and urging him to store
grain to feed the Egyptian people. This nickname that was affixed to Willcocks fit
with his own thoughts of himself as bringing great agricultural abundance to regions
through engineering and his attempts to frame his work in biblical terms.
By 1920 Willcocks had a series of lectures that included him relating biblical
figures and stories to the work that he and other British engineers had, were and
would like to be doing throughout the Middle East and North Africa. In one such
speech he revealed his attempt, “[w]hile in Babylonia for three years…to see where
a garden could be placed which could be irrigated by free flow through the twelve
months of the year.”38 Willcocks’ efforts to recreate a Garden of Eden on the
Euphrates never materialized, but his pursuit gives insight into the thought process
of civil engineers in North Africa and the Middle East. Not only were they reforming
agricultural production for people they saw as inferior through a process of
Orientalism, they were also, through their ingenuity and ability to bring life with
irrigation, on par with the biblical figures of old.
The confidence of Cromer and Willcocks in their abilities as colonial
administrators and the perceived value of building a dam to the Egyptian people as
seen through a declensionist narrative left little in the way of breaking ground on
the first Aswan Dam. However, the depictions of the Egyptian ruins throughout
Europe in the nineteenth century would also encourage Euro-centric public

37

Willcocks, Egyptian Irrigation, xvii.
William Willcocks, From the Garden of Eden to the Crossing of the Jordan (London:
Spon and Chamberlain, 1920), 13.
38

Cook, 20
opposition of the dam. The design of the dam threatened to flood the ruins of Philae,
which, due to its central location on an island within the river and symmetrical
structure, was a popular destination for European tourists and a popular muse for
artists and photographers.39 Just as the Ancient ruins were seen by British engineers
and policymakers as something to be emulated and an example of more abundant
times, the British public saw the ruins as their cultural heritage that ought to be
preserved.
The main debates in the British press surrounded the potential of the Aswan
reservoir of flooding the ruins. One British daily articulated the argument held by
“several representatives of Art, Science and Literature, who deprecate needless
destruction of monuments.”40 The article served as a petition that urged the British
government to recognize the “importance of Egypt in the history of civilization
[which] is now so fully recognized that…we may rely upon your Lordship’s
sympathy in the consideration of any means whereby injury to, or destruction of,
the ancient monuments of that country may be avoided.”41 These appeals to those in
charge of the Aswan Low Dam construction concerned the ruins themselves.
Complete with the disregard of the people of the Nile River Valley and the way the
Dam would alter their way of life. Furthermore, the call by British academics to save
the monuments displays the connection that many Europeans made between the
ancient empires and that of their own.
39
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It was this opposition that posed the biggest obstacle to political
administrators and engineers’ attempts at building the Aswan Low Dam. The
response from the engineers was one that had been proposed in the aforementioned
petition. The plan called for “constructing a lower dam at an available point, with the
addition at a later period of another above it…or for building a lower part of a large
dam where it would effect the least.”42 The proposals for building these lower dams
were also predicated on the assumption that a large reservoir would be useless until
the agricultural and industrial infrastructure of Egypt was developed to utilize that
much water. Building a lower dam was decided upon and engineers were enlisted to
help fortify the temple itself against flood. John Ball was later praised in the British
press for his efforts, “[w]hen the temples of Philae were endangered by the
construction of the Aswan Dam in 1901…to design and supervise the execution of
the important underpinning works.”43 The public sentiment against the Dam was
satiated through even more reliance on technological fixes to facilitate protecting
the ruins. A solution that left the temple of Philae partially submerged throughout
much of the year.
Once the solution to the British public’s concern was accepted there was little
in the way of Cromer and Willcocks who began construction of the Dam in 1898. By
1902 it was completed, which “increased the supply of summer water throughout
the country…allowing some areas in the region to switch from basin to perennial
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irrigation.”44 With the completion of this Dam a fundamental transformation in the
ecology of the Nile River Valley had occurred. No longer would the annual floods of
the Nile replenish the land every year. Furthermore, the British led transition from
basin irrigation to perennial irrigation had been achieved.
Initially Cromer and Willcocks saw the Dam as a great success. In 1916
Cromer praised the British engineers for their role in the construction of the Dam by
proclaiming that they, “ha[ve] already rendered invaluable service to the country.”45
In his description of the Dam Cromer overlooks the problems that were already
beginning to show surrounding the unsustainability of perennial agriculture in
regards to water evaporation, water salination and soil depletion. He also expressed
his great joy that, “[w]orks are now in course of execution which will increase its
storage capacity by about 2¼ millions of cubic metres.”46 The British engineers who
worked on the project also saw the Dam in glowing terms immediately after its
construction.
In 1904 Willcocks wrote that “[s]ix years ago a few far reaching men saw
clearly what all of us understand to-day.”47 In this quote Willcocks referenced the
original plans of the Aswan Low Dam and his colleagues Airs and Baker. As he stated
by 1904 the Dam “had worked for two years and given satisfaction.”48 What is clear
is that by 1904 Willcocks and other civil engineers would view the first Aswan Low
Dam not as a project that disrupted traditional ways of irrigation and fertilizing for a
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model that was far more ecologically disruptive, but as a shining example of British
colonial ingenuity.
The Orientalist and developmentalist assumptions held by these men would
prove detrimental as Cromer would be removed from his post and Willcocks would
later denounce some of the shortcomings of the Dam. Rather than accepting
Cromer’s benevolent vision of his role and the role of the British government in
advancing the interests of Egyptians there was a growing Egyptian nationalist
movement that would force his resignation in 1907. His resignation was hurried by
an incident in the small town Denshawai where a group of villagers were punished
for the death of a British officer who was killed in an altercation.49 Egyptian
nationalists saw the punishment that was enforced by the British as particularly
cruel because it included multiple death sentences and floggings. This incident
amplified claims by nationalists that were articulated by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in
1907. He wrote in an Egyptian newspaper Al-Jarida that Cromer “has deprived
Egypt of the political life for which every living nation yearns.”50 The nationalist
opposition to Cromer emphasized his Orientalist assumptions of the inability of
Egyptians or Ottomans in participating in the government. In Cromer’s demise the
same prejudices that led him to blindly support the Aswan Low Dam led to a
growing nationalist sentiment among those whose lives were affected by his far
reaching policies.
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Willcocks went on to critique his own project as history proved that the
hubris that had led him to believe he could control the Nile was unfounded. The
main critique he had was the inability of the Dam design to let the Nile silt
downriver, as he had expected. In 1919 Willcocks condemned elements of the Dam
and also gave strong recommendations for not raising it. He wrote that, “I maintain
that, if the Aswan Dam is to be raised, measures must be taken to increase the water
supply passing Aswan.”51 The policies that Willcocks now endorsed followed a
lengthy critique of the problems of not letting enough sediment through the Dam
sluices, which would require far more water to pass through than he had originally
planned. This realization came to him through an understanding of the beneficence
of basin irrigation in the Sudan. Willcocks’ critiques came too late as the Dam
already began to take its toll on the soil quality of much of the Nile River Valley and
officials raised it once more and adapted it for energy production.
The history of the Aswan Low Dam is one that is often overlooked in modern
scholarship, but deserves further examination. The Orientalist and declensionist
narratives that were created by Western Europeans in the nineteenth century led to
a number of miscalculations of the effects of the Dam. As Cromer and Willcocks filled
their role in this Euro-centric narrative they altered the lives of countless people in
the Nile River Valley for generations to come. The same processes that led to the
underestimation of the ecological and social impacts of damming the Nile continued
with the Aswan High Dam project under Nasser. As modernist rational continued to
inform irrigation methods on the Nile through the twentieth century the same
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ecological, social and cultural issues involved with perennial irrigation in the Nile
River Valley persisted. The first Aswan Dam provides a case study for understanding
the biases that underpin much of the efforts of modernist-minded developers
throughout the world well into the twenty-first century and continues to
demonstrate the very real impact of cultural prejudice on the supposedly objective
aims of scientists and engineers.

Figure 1: Frederick Goodall, The Rising of the Nile, 1865. Oil on Canvas.
http://www.magnoliabox.com/art/98686/The_Rising_of_the_Nile_1865.
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